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I
INTRODUCTION
Congress adopted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA")1 to help alleviate the problems
created by contaminated waste sites and to provide for fast and effective cleanup
of hazardous waste. CERCLA grants authority to certain parties to initiate
cleanup efforts and provides retroactive, strict, and joint and several liability to
ensure that the costs of the cleanup are borne by parties causally responsible for
the waste. Because any given unit of commercial real property is likely to have
had several owners and/or lessees, each possibly contributing to on-site
contamination, allocating responsibility for cleanup costs presents a unique
challenge.
CERCLA is ambiguous concerning the use of equitable principles in
allocating costs to various parties. Many courts have interpreted CERCLA to
proscribe the use of equitable defenses, including caveat emptor.2 Without
caveat emptor, CERCLA allows a purchaser of commercial property, with actual
or constructive notice of contamination, to buy the property for a discounted
price reflecting environmental defects, and then sue the seller for at least partial
restitution of cleanup costs. Thus, the seller may pay for the cost of cleanup
twice: once in the discounted selling price and again if held strictly liable for the
cleanup costs incurred by the purchaser. The seller acts as an unwitting insurer
for the purchaser by assuming all of the risk of exposure for preexisting
environmental contamination. The purchaser insulates itself from risks that it
should have considered when the transaction was undertaken, and may obtain
a double recovery.
A double recovery is both unfair to the seller and economically inefficient.
Society creates aggregate demand and supply for transactions dealing with
contaminated, or possibly contaminated, property. Like all markets, the market
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). The act is commonly referred
to as "Superfund."
2. "Caveat emptor" means "let the buyer beware." See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
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for real property considers the costs inherent in supplying the good. Because,
the cost of a cleanup is not accurately factored into the price of the property, the
market will not adequately reflect the total cost of the property. The cost of the
cleanup, if performed by the government, will be shouldered by society and not
by the parties to the transaction. This is an "externality."3 CERCLA's liability
scheme "internalizes" this cost by requiring the party (or parties) involved in
causing the site's contamination to pay the cost of cleanup, regardless of fault.4
In the CERCLA liability scheme, however, the internalization occurs ex post, in
that parties do not include the cleanup as an actual cost until the legal system
imposes the costs upon a party. As a result, parties involved in a transaction
perceive the cost of the property to be lower than it is, creating a diseconomy,
or a market distortion, and leading to a greater number of sales than would be
desired had the true costs been understood. Assuming that all contaminated
property involved in these transactions will someday need to be cleaned, society
will have been involved in far more property transactions than desired. This
misallocation of societal resources is a direct result of the lack of complete
information regarding the entity's inherent costs. Transforming CERCLA from
an ex post to an ex ante internalization scheme, at least with regard to private
parties, would help to remove this misallocation.
Today, thirteen years after CERCLA's enactment, one can assume that both
parties to a commercial land transaction are aware of their potential liability
under CERCLA. Due to the threat of an Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") enforcement action against the purchaser when he or she becomes an
"owner," an incentive exists for the purchaser to investigate the site prior to
purchase: the innocent owner defense.5 However, better incentives are required
for sellers voluntarily to disclose fully and for purchasers to account for
environmental costs and risks more accurately in cases where the EPA is not
involved. In fact, in the absence of effective indemnity, the possibility of the
purchaser obtaining a double recovery acts as a disincentive to full disclosure.
Wherever possible, it would be to the seller's advantage to conceal known
contamination in the hope that an inflated price would cover any potential
CERCLA exposure.
In the case of private party transactional law, fairness and economic
rationality suggest that we move to a system of full disclosure of contamination
and that the legal institution require the purchaser to consider this risk when
agreeing to a price. CERCLA should be interpreted by the courts to allow a
fully disclosing seller to assert the equitable defense of caveat emptor against the
3. Mansfield calls this form of externality an "external diseconomy of production." EDWIN
MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 475-76 (5th ed. 1985).
4. For the seminal discussion on utilizing liability schemes to internalize an externality, see
ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 183-96 (4th ed. 1932).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988). This defense protects a purchaser, in certain circumstances,
from liability in restitution to third parties who have cleaned up the purchaser's property. See infra note
18.
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purchaser in the liability phase of a private party suit to recover cleanup costs.6
Caveat emptor's proscription of ex post cost recovery will provide an incentive
for the purchaser to assess accurately the potential environmental costs and to
account for those costs in the purchase price, preventing the purchaser from
obtaining a double recovery.
This article discusses the applicability of equitable defenses in private party
CERCLA actions. Part II sketches the purpose and origin of CERCLA with a
view toward establishing the special place of equity in private party claims. Part
III discusses equity generally, and the equitable defense of caveat emptor
specifically. Part IV reviews CERCLA's effects on the market for real property
transactions. Part V argues that applying caveat emptor to CERCLA private
party claims would better effectuate the goal of economic efficiency in the
market for real property. Part VI discusses and analyzes those cases that have
disallowed caveat emptor in the liability phase of CERCLA, those that disallow
it entirely, and those that have decided in favor of caveat emptor and other
equitable defenses. Part VII concludes that the defense is available for the
courts to use at their discretion and that holding the purchaser responsible for
the property he or she purchases is economically and equitably beneficial.
II
CERCLA
A. Purpose and Origin
In 1979, Congress began "searching for solutions to the problems of how to
clean up old hazardous waste dump sites that now threaten our environment, and
for ways to clean up future spills of hazardous wastes."7 Much of the concern
that ultimately resulted in the creation of CERCLA developed with the
discovery of the human health threats posed by the hazardous waste dumps at
New York's Love Canal, Missouri's Times Beach, and Kentucky's Valley of the
Drums.8 The congressional hearings and the original drafts of the proposed
House and Senate bills also evidence a concern for remediation to people who
6. The government's overriding need to fund future cleanups through recovery of prior cleanup
costs is a strong policy argument for distinguishing between government and private party actions under
CERCLA. See infra text accompanying notes 27-31.
7. Administration Testimony on S. 1480 Before the Subcomms. on Environmental Pollution and
Resource Protection, Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979)
(statement of Sen. John C. Culver), reprinted in 1 COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUB. WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D
SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION,
AND LIABILITY Acr OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), at 55 (1983) [hereinafter CERCLA LEG. HIST.].
8. Id. at 60, 86-90 (statement of Thomas C. Jorling, Assistant Administrator, Water and Waste
Management, Environmental Protection Agency); S. REP. No. 96-848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1980),
reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEG. HIST., supra note 7, at 311-12; H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 18-21 (1980), reprinted in 2 CERCLA LEG. HIST., supra note 7, at 49-52. See also JAN
PAUL ACTON, UNDERSTANDING SUPERFUND, A PROGRESS REPORT 1 (1989); Barbara Ann White,
Economizing on the Sins of Our Past: Cleaning Up Our Hazardous Wastes, 25 HouS. L. REV. 899, 899-
900 (1988).
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were harmed by these sites,9 and for response and remediation of land
contamination caused by petroleum.0 Both of these concerns were ultimately
omitted from CERCLA, however. The latter was expressly omitted as a result
of political maneuvering to pass the bill before outgoing President Jimmy Carter
left office and Ronald Reagan entered.1
CERCLA provides methods by which the government can attain the
congressional goal of reducing the threat to human health and the environment
caused by hazardous waste. The statute provides for use of the Hazardous
Substance Superfund, 2 a trust fund derived from taxes levied on the manufac-
turers of petroleum, chemical feedstocks (the basal constituents of usable
chemicals), and from a general corporate environmental tax. This fund is to be
replenished either by awards won by the government against responsible parties
or, when no responsible parties can be found, by future tax revenues. Because
the EPA must spend funds before they are reimbursed, there is a limit to the
amount of cleanups that can be undertaken by the EPA at any time. Due to this
limit, and to Congress's desire to facilitate cleanups in general, CERCLA allows
the EPA to issue administrative orders to private parties under section 106 "to
secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat."'3 Those
parties who have received a section 106 order to remediate must clean up the
9. The original Senate bill did not provide for personal third-party toxic tort remedies, 125 CONG.
REc. 17,988 (1979) (statement of Sen. John C. Culver on Introducing S. 1480), reprinted in 1 CERCLA
LEG. HIST., supra note 7, at 147, but it did provide for recovery of loss of income and out-of-pocket
medical expenses. S. REP. No. 96-848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 32 (1980), reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEG.
HIST., supra note 7, at 305, 339. This was partially due to the belief that state law was adequate in
providing permanent remedies. See County Line Investment Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1517 (10th
Cir. 1991); see also Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1299-1300 (D. Del.
1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988). The lack of third-party toxic tort remedies also reflected the
belief that EPA "could protect more of the public by containing more of these sites than by addressing
our scarce resources to one, two or three of these sites." Administration Testimony on S. 1480 Before
the Subcomms. on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection, Senate Comm. on Environment and
Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979) (statement of Thomas C. Jorling, Assistant Administrator,
Water and Waste Management, Environmental Protection Agency), reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEG. HIST.,
supra note 7, at 65. The original bill also did not include third-party provisions because it was difficult
to determine at any given time the total medical expenses caused by hazardous wastes. Id.
10. Administration Testimony on S. 1480 Before the Subcomms. on Environmental Pollution and
Resource Protection, Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979)
(statement of Thomas C. Jorling, Assistant Administrator, Water and Waste Management, Environ-
mental Protection Agency), reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEG. HIST., supra note 7, at 86, 131-32.
11. "There is perhaps no more telling evidence of the supercharged political atmosphere that begat
Superfund than that it was passed by a lame-duck Congress during the transition from a Democratic to
a Republican administration." Roger C. Dower, Hazardous Wastes, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECION 151, 169 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990).
CERCLA expressly excludes "petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not
otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance" from its definition of "hazardous
substance." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988).
12. The use of the Hazardous Substance Superfund is outlined in CERCLA § 111. 42 U.S.C. §
9611 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). See also 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (Internal Revenue Code
authorizing the "Hazardous Substances Superfund"). While the EPA may use the fund for remediation
of sites on the National Priority List ("NPL"), see below, it may also pursue fund-based cleanups for sites
not on the NPL but in need of emergency response pursuant to CERCLA § 104. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(4)
(1988).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988).
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subject site themselves and may then sue any other responsible parties under
section 107(a)(4)(B) to recover costs not attributable to themselves. 14 It is this
same provision, section 107(a)(4)(B), that has been interpreted to allow a private
cause of action without government intervention.
B. CERCLA's Liability Scheme
When any party remediates a site under CERCLA, it has recourse to the
liability provisions of section 107, which places retroactive,1 5 strict, 16 and joint
and several liability 7 on owners 8 and operators of contaminated sites, vessels,
14. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
15. CERCLA has often been attacked on due process principles by defendants who charge that
liability imposed ex post facto violates their constitutional right of fair notice. These attacks have been
fruitless, however, as courts have found the retroactive legislation to be "supported by a legitimate
legislative purpose." Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1984);
see also United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726,733 (8th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 428-31 (D.N.J. 1991); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc.,
630 F. Supp. 1361, 1398 (D.N.H. 1985), affd in part and vacated in part, 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990);
United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 213-14 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
16. See United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D.N.J. 1983) ("Though strict liability
may impose harsh results on certain defendants, it is the most equitable solution in view of the
alternative-forcing those who bear no responsibility for causing the damage, the taxpayers, to shoulder
the full cost of the cleanup."), cited in Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 419. See also New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659
F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (D. Del. 1987), affd, 851 F.2d 643 (3rd Cir. 1988).
Congress utilized strict liability not only due to its fairness, S. REP. No. 96-848, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 31-34 (1980), reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEG. HIST., supra note 7, at 305, 338-42 (the strict liability
scheme "is to assure that the costs of injuries resulting from ... hazardous substances are borne by the
persons who create such risks rather than the injured parties"), but also due to its capacity to make
industry aware of the true economic costs of its endeavor. Id. at 34, reprinted in 1 CERCLA Leg. Hist.,
supra note 7, at 341.
17. CERCLA liability is said to be "joint and several, as a matter of federal common law."
SUPERFuND AMENDMENTs AND REAUTHORIZATION Acr OF 1986, H.R. REP. No. 253(1), 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 74 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (99 Stat.) 2835, 2856. See also Ottati & Goss, 630 F.
Supp. at 1395-96; and Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, Liability Act of 1980,45 Bus. LAW. 923, 977-79
(1990) and cases cited therein.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988). The enumerated defenses to § 107 liability are limited to
proving that the waste was caused by an act of God (§ 107(b)(1)), an act of war (§ 107(b)(2)), or an act
or omission of a third party not associated with the party by contract (§ 107(b)(3)). 42 U.S.C. §
9607(b)(1)-(3). But, as one commentator points out:
Ordinarily, a landowner who purchases contaminated land would have no defense
under the "act or omission of a third party" provision [section 107(b)(3)] because
he would be considered in direct or indirect contractual relationship with previous
landowners. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986,
however, added a definition of contractual relationship to section 101(35), which
provides for a limited measure of relief. It excludes innocent subsequent
landowners, who made a diligent inquiry of site conditions, from the category of
parties having a direct or indirect contractual relationship with previous owners.
By this exclusion, a narrow group of innocent subsequent landowners have been
provided with a statutory defense to strict liability.
Edmund B. Frost, Strict Liability as an Incentive for Cleanup of Contaminated Property, 25 HOus. L.
REV. 951, 955 (1988) (citations omitted).
Current property owners who planned for potential environmental problems, but found no
contamination through "diligent inquiry," are capable of obtaining a double recovery under CERCLA.
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or facilities, 9 as well as any person" who transported 21 or accepted hazardous
materials.' The express defenses to section 107 liability are limited to proof
by the party that the site's contamination was caused solely by an act of God,
war, or an unrelated third party.'
CERCLA imposes restitutionary liability, traditionally considered an
equitable remedy,' by awarding to the cleaner "all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by the United States Government ... not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan."' CERCLA also allows for restitution of "any other
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan."'
These people belong to the "narrow group" described by Frost. Thirteen years after the enactment of
CERCLA, the group of exempted landowners is probably incorrectly categorized as "narrow," as it is
becoming increasingly obvious to sophisticated purchasers that it is beneficial to make a "diligent inquiry
of site conditions." See, e.g., Johnine J. Brown, Keeping Clean: Avoiding Hazardous Waste Liability, in
THE IMPACr OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ON BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 211 (PLI Real Est. L.
and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 322, 1988) [hereinafter PLI HANDBOOK]; David J. Hayes et
al., Cercla Rights and Liabilities, in THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON REAL ESTATE AND
OTHER COMMERCIAL TRANSACIONS 3 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study Materials, 1991) [hereinafter
A.L.I.-A.B.A. MATERIALS]; Joel S. Moskowitz, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND REAL PROPERTY
TRANSACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.2 (1989 & Supp. 1991). The question left to be answered is
what a party that does not uncover hazardous waste contamination during its inquiry must prove to be
considered "diligent."
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1). The term "owner and operator," as defined by 42 U.S.C. §
9601(20)(A), does not include someone who "holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security
interest in the vessel or facility." This has been controversial of late due to dicta in United States v.
Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1990), which stated that a lender capable of persuading
a company to take environmental precautions may be held liable under CERCLA for contamination
caused by a bankrupt company it has foreclosed upon. EPA has proposed an addition to the National
Contingency Plan which specifically limits lender liability. National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798, at 28,810 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300).
20. "The term 'person' means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium,
joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political
subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
22. Id. § 9607(a)(4). CERCLA provides that all substances designated as "hazardous" or "toxic"
under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (Supp. I 1990), the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1321(b)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. 111990), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921
(Supp. II. 1990), and the Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1988), as well as any other
substances EPA deems appropriate, are hazardous wastes for the purposes of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. §
9601(14). Unlike the Clean Water Act, CERCLA specifically excludes petroleum from its definition of
hazardous substances. However, the definition does not include petroleum or petroleum products that
are mixed with other hazardous substances or mixed with substances that produce a hazardous substance
upon combination. The definition also does not include petroleum that has contaminated over time.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). See supra note 18.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 626-27 (D.N.H. 1988); see also Boeing Co.
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 784 P.2d 507, 517-19 (Wash. 1990) (Callow, J., dissenting) (indemnifi-
cation agreements that expressly cover only "damages" incurred by the indemnitee do not include
CERCLA recoveries because CERCLA allows for restitution and not for "damages"). Though the form
of liability is considered restitutionary, not all agree to what extent this restitution is equitable in nature.
See infra Part VI.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). See also The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-300.920 (1992) [hereinafter National Contingency Plan or NCP].
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added). Much controversy has arisen over what a private
party must do to clean in a manner "consistent with the national contingency plan." On March 8, 1990,
the EPA stated that it believes consistency "should be measured by whether the private party cleanup
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The significant attention drawn by hazardous waste contamination has
produced intense pressure on the EPA to clean up sites and to recover
Superfund expenses. Due to the need to replenish Superfund, public and private
restitution actions for hazardous waste cleanups are fundamentally different.
Under CERCLA, the EPA may recover costs of remediation' or response, 28
but a private party can recover only response costs. The EPA has recourse to
Superfund 29 for expenses incurred during a response to a release that poses a
"substantial and imminent danger to the public health or welfare."'  The EPA
also has recourse to Superfund for permanent remediation of sites listed on the
National Priority List.31 The EPA uses the fund to investigate and clean sites;
the government then brings actions against potentially responsible parties
("PRPs") to reimburse Superfund.32 It is clear that CERCLA's scheme of joint
has, when evaluated as a whole, achieved 'substantial compliance' with potentially applicable
requirements, and resulted in a CERCLA quality cleanup." NCP, 55 Fed. Reg. 46,8793 (1990) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)). This test reflects the EPA's concerns that:
it is important to encourage private parties to perform voluntary cleanups of sites
and to remove unnecessary obstacles to their ability to recover their costs from the
parties that are liable for the contamination. At the same time, EPA believes it
is important to establish a standard against which to measure cleanups that qualify
for cost recovery under CERCLA, so that only CERCLA-quality cleanups are
encouraged.
Id. at 46,8792-93.
Failure to comply with the NCP does not create liability for the cleaning private party. It simply
disallows recovery under CERCLA's liability scheme. Id. at 46,8796. Restitution for the plaintiff's
expenses under the unjust enrichment theory may be possible under a state law claim. Id.
The court in Amland Properties Corp. v ALCOA, 711 F. Supp. 784 (D.NJ. 1989), stated that to
be consistent with the NCP, a private party must either follow the specific provisions delineated in the
NCP or prove to the court that one or more of the elements of the NCP were inappropriate given the
circumstances. Id. at 799-800.
For a good recent discussion of these issues, see County Line Inv. Co. v Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508
(10th Cir. 1991) (barring recovery to a private party for failure to comply with the NCP as it existed
when the plaintiff took investigatory and remedial actions).
27. CERCLA § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24), defines "remedy" or "remedial action" to be "those
actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions."
28. CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25), defines "'respond' or 'response' [to mean] remove,
removal, and remedial action; all such terms... include enforcement activities related thereto."
29. This fund receives its monies from taxes on petroleum and chemical feedstocks, as well as from
a general corporate environmental tax, and is intended to be a revolving fund whose sources are to be
replenished when the government either settles with responsible parties or wins a judgment against a
responsible party. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988 & Supp. 111990); see also 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988 & Supp.
111990) (Internal Revenue Code provision for the Hazardous Substance Superfund); 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-
12 (1988 & Supp. 111990) (tax on crude oil); 26 U.S.C. 99 4661-62 (1988) (tax on chemical feedstocks);
and 26 U.S.C. § 59A (1988 & Supp. 111990) (general corporate environmental tax).
30. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
31. CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988). The NPL is published as an appendix to the NCP.
40 C.F.R. 300, app. B (1991). Sites on the NPL are those that have been found by the EPA to present
the greatest danger to human health and the environment. Each site is ranked according to several
factors that reflect the extent of the toxicity, combustibility, explosivity, access to air and water channels,
and proximity to human contact. The EPA utilizes what is referred to as the "Hazardous Waste Site
Ranking System" to determine the relative priority for cleaning up a particular site. 40 C.F.R. Part 300,
App. A (1982). For insight into and comments about how sites are selected for the NPL, see OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMING CLEAN: SUPERFUND PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED 85-136 (1989).
32. See generally Anne D. Weber, Note, Misery Loves Company: Spreading the Costs of CERCLA
Cleanup, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1469, 1474-88 (1989).
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and several liability furthers the goal of quickly reimbursing Superfund, thus
freeing the EPA to pursue other cleanup activities.33 Because a high priority
of public suits is to replenish Superfund, and not to allocate applicable costs
among private parties, proscription of caveat emptor as a defense is justified.
Since private party actions do not involve governmental enforcement policy and
utilization of Superfund monies, however, the same rationale does not apply.
Courts have recognized a private cause of action under CERCLA even
though the legislative history provides no evidence of debate or discussion on the
issue.3 The plain language of section 107(a)(4)(B) unequivocally allows "any
other person" besides the government to recover "any other costs of response"
necessarily incurred during a cleanup that was done in a manner that is
"consistent with the [NCP]."'35 While this allows the private party claim, courts
have been left with no congressional guidance in determining which costs are
"necessary" and therefore recoverable. 6
33. Dower, supra note 11, at 175.
Joint and several liability ensures that the government will not need to find every available
defendant in order to recover its costs. See United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D. Mich.
1989); see also United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 63 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 845 n.26 (W.D. Mo. 1984). The
minimization of legal costs (and time spent on litigation) allows the government the liberty to pursue
more actual cleanups.
One commentator has written that "the legislative history [of SARA] reflected that in replenishing
the Superfund, Congress was aware that the EPA would not have adequate monetary and personnel
resources to clean up all the hazardous waste sites that needed attention." Steven B. Russo, Note,
Contribution Under CERCLA: Judicial Treatment After SARA, 14 COLUM. J. ENvM. L. 267, 269 (1989)
(citations omitted).
Another commentator has stated that
[t]he primary question is whether society as a whole will bear the costs of the cleanup or
whether the industries that created the wastes will. Once Congress has decided that industry,
and not society, shall pay for the cleanup, the next question is who in industry will pay. If we
abide by the strict rules of causation, whereby individual firms pay only for those cleanup costs
that are demonstrably theirs, then the responsibility for a substantial portion of the waste
cleanup will still fall on society's shoulders.... Thus to ensure that society as a whole pays as
little as possible for cleanup costs, the EPA argues for, and the courts impose, joint and several
liability.
White, supra note 8, at 911-13 (footnotes omitted).
34. See, e.g., Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311,318 n.6 (6th Cir. 1985); Dedham Water
Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1078 (1st Cir. 1986); Pinole Point Properties, Inc.
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 293 (N.D. Cal. 1984); County Line Inv. Co. v Tinney, 933
F.2d 1508, 1511 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the
Cases Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45
Bus. LAW. 923,937-38 (1990); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Recovering Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: The Private
Cause of Action Under CERCLA, 13 ECOL. L.Q. 181, 183 (1986).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
36. One issue is whether preliminary costs, necessary to determining the scope of the problem but
not done consistently with the NCP, are recoverable. One commentator believes that a broad reading
of the phrase "necessary cost of response" is "consistent with the congressional intent to encourage
private cleanup efforts." Gaba, supra note 34, at 215; see also Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696
F. Supp. 994, 999-1000 (D.NJ. 1988) ("[R]emedial investigations such as the one undertaken by
Southland are consistently held to be within the scope of response costs."). However, some courts have
ruled that preliminary assessments must comply with the NCP to be recoverable. See Tinney, 933 F.2d
at 1511 (ruling that investigation and closing costs were not recoverable because they were not incurred
consistently with the NCP); accord Amland Properties Corp. v. ALCOA, 711 F. Supp. 784, 790, 794
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C. SARA and Contribution Rights: The Two-Phased Approach
Prior to the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986,37
CERCLA did not expressly provide for contribution among responsible parties
held jointly and severally liable. Nonetheless, courts implied that the right of
contribution was intended by the overall scheme of CERCLA or by the federal
common law.' SARA embodied express acceptance of the right of contribu-
tion among responsible parties.39 The goals of the new contribution section
echoed the overall goals of SARA: to "encourage quicker, more equitable
settlements, decrease litigation and thus facilitate cleanups."'  By allowing
contribution suits, CERCLA facilitates settlement between the EPA and any
potentially responsible party (often a "deep pocket"), who then may pursue
contribution actions against other PRPs4
SARA creates a two-phased approach to CERCLA liability: liability to the
government by a party or parties, presumably a deep pocket, followed by
contribution suits (with the government no longer involved in the litigation)
against other PRPs. The nature of the first phase is retroactive, joint and
several, strict liability. The nature of the second phase differs from the first in
that it expressly considers equitable factors in the apportionment process.
The first phase quickly delivers the funds necessary to replenish Superfund
into the hands of the EPA, which requires the funds to fulfill its obligation of
remediating more sites. The second phase gives the party that funded the
(D.N.J. 1989). Part of the controversy is caused by CERCLA's definition of "response costs" which
includes "the costs of investigating and remedying the effects of a release .... " Tinney, 933 F.2d at 1512
n.7 (citing CERCLA § 101(23)-(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)-(25)). It should be noted that the definition
does not require investigation to be done consistently with the NCP; parties and courts have interpreted
the definition to be modified by the language of § 107(a)(4)(B)'s consistency clause.
37. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805-08 (S.D. Ohio 1983); see
also United States v New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1269 (D. Del. 1986); United States v
Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 228 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
39. CERCLA § 113(0(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1988), now provides as follows:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) [§107(a)] ... during or following any civil
action under section 9606 [§1061 of this title or under section 9607(a) [§107(a)] of
this title. . . . In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response
costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are
appropriate.
The legislative history of SARA states that the "uniform federal rule on joint and several liability
[promulgated by the court in Chem-Dyne] is correct and should be followed.... [N]othing in this bill
is intended to change the application of the uniform federal rule of joint and several liability enunciated
by the Chem-Dyne court." SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND REAUTHORIZATION Acr OF 1986, H.R.
Rep. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 2835, 2856.
40. H.R. Rep. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 59, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 2835, 2841.
41. See generally Weber, supra note 32, at 1469; Russo, supra note 33 (discussing different forms
of apportionment possible under CERCLA); see also, Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz,
Apportioning Damages Among Potentially Insolvent Actors, 19 J. LEG. STUD. 617 (1990) (distinguishing
between "legal contribution," that which allows the initially liable party to sue others only for their
respective share of the contamination, and "equitable contribution," that which allocates to others their
respective share of the contamination, plus their proportionate share of the costs of cleaning
contamination caused by now insolvent contributors).
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cleanup "its day in court," by allowing it to sue other responsible parties. While
the first phase acts as an expedited emergency action, the second phase acts
more like a conventional suit. This is true because the second phase considers
the relative positions of the parties. The second phase is also almost always
more complex and time consuming.
While the advantage of the two-phased system is obvious-Superfund
replenishment is expedited-as noted above, it is unnecessary in purely private
party claims. Private PRPs have no obligation to clean other sites, and thus have
no similar need to expedite replenishment of funds.42 CERCLA should allow
courts trying private party cases to collapse the two phases when it would be
feasible. Accordingly, the relative equitable positions of the parties in private
claims need not be passed over in haste. Fairness and efficiency in private party
cases can replace the "quick fix" of the government liability case.
CERCLA courts may implement equitable principles in a variety of ways.
First, in determining the seller's liability, courts could interpret CERCLA to
allow the use of the equitable factors that permeate the other aspects of
CERCLA. Second, courts, recognizing the equitable jurisdiction that emanates
from CERCLA's restitutionary nature, could exercise their inherent power as
courts of equity by applying equitable principles. Third, courts could collapse the
distinction between section 107 liability and section 113 contribution actions,
applying the equitable principles of section 113 at the earlier stage. Finally,
courts may apply caveat emptor by declaring the general liability of the seller,
but equitably denying any recovery to the purchaser during the contribution
phase. The purchaser under the last two options is brought into the contribution
claim as the owner of the property. Certainly, in cases where there are many
PRPs, the court may be aided by bifurcating the process. In situations where a
current owner is suing only the former owner(s), however, the court could
dismiss the issue of liability based on the equities between the two parties.
The next section analyzes the defense of caveat emptor and its equitable
characteristics generally as a prelude to its treatment in CERCLA decisions.
III
EQUITY AND CAVEAT EMPTOR
The body of law termed "equity" has a rich and mythic history in this coun-
try. Equity, by definition, concerns itself with inherent fairness to individuals,
even in the absence of a clear-cut policy established by the representative
42. Of course, all parties would prefer immediate reimbursement for all expenditures made on
behalf of another. In all instances when the legal process is used, reimbursement will be delayed. Those
who argue that cleanups will be avoided if a private party is required to wait through an entire
proceeding involving the equities of the case do not consider the realities of the legal system. The threat
of the government bringing a suit against the private party, which could require that party to seek
contribution under § 113 anyway, should be sufficient to induce the rational, risk-averse property owner
to remediate. Likewise, cleaning a site at an earlier stage ensures that the problem will not become
worse (and those affected by the contamination will be affected to a lesser degree).
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majority. Above all, equity concerns itself with the amorphous goal of "justice."
Edward Re, expanding on Zechariah Chaffee, Jr.'s definition, described equity
as
a way of looking at the administration of justice, the goal is to do justice in the particular
case. It implies a liberating influence which mitigates the rigidity of formal rules. Its aim
is to achieve an individualization of justice. In this sense, equity is that part of our legal
heritage that has given the law an ethical dimension. In extolling virtues of candor and
good faith, it reaffirms the moral element of a just society.43
Some commentators claim the principles of equity have an implicit position
in our system of jurisprudence; they are principles understood by all judges, and
need not be included in statutes because their nature makes them implicit in all
formal law.' This view emanates from the belief that there are absolute forms
of just behavior and that judges are capable of knowing them. While the
existence of "just behavior," in absolute terms, is by no means a settled concept,
equity has been expounded upon by legal tradition. Equitable principles, derived
from the English Chancery courts' decisions, have survived as reasonably well-
defined maxims.45 Historically, the recognition of equitable defenses and
remedies has always been at the discretion of a judge with equitable powers.'
Justice Story wrote, "[T]he exercise of ... equity jurisprudence ... is not a
matter of right in either party; but a matter of discretion in the Court ... which
governs itself, as far as it may, by general rules and principles ... according to
the circumstances of each particular case . . .. 47
Modern environmental law has proved a difficult area in which to determine
the proper role of a court's equitable discretion. Federal environmental law
appears to emanate from both traditionally legal and traditionally equitable
powers. At the same time, many federal statutes include provisions allowing
courts to use the discretionary equitable power of injunction.'
Real property transactions, which, until recently, have not been a traditional
subject of complex statutes, have historically been subject to equitable
considerations.49 For instance, nondisclosure of potential hazardous waste
43. EDWARD D. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQurrY AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES xvii (5th
ed. 1975).
44. See, e.g., id. at 221 n.3 (quoting Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics).
45. See id at 11-14. Re lists several of these maxims, among them: "He who seeks in equity must
do equity"; "He who comes in equity must come with clean hands"; "Equity aids the vigilant, not those
who slumber on their rights"; "Equity follows the law"; "Equity regards substance rather than form";
"Equity imputes an intent to fulfill an obligation"; "Between equal equities the law will prevail";
"Between equal equities the first in order of time shall prevail"; "Equity abhors a forfeiture"; and
"Equity will not aid a volunteer."
46. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 52-55 (1973); Re, supra note 43, at
776.
47. JOSEPH STORY, 2 EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA
§ 1026 (14th ed. 1918).
48. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunc-
tions, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. 513 (1984) (concluding that the focus of courts applying environmental statutes
should be on congressional intent and not on "the equity mystique").
49. "With respect to contracts for the sale of land, the role of equity has long been paramount."
ROBERTS. THOMPSON & JOHN A. SEBERT, JR., REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EourrY AND RESTITUTION 855
(2d ed. 1989).
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liability to a prospective buyer may be a cause for relief for the buyer on the
contract;' ° the same is not true, however, when the defects of the property are
known or are sufficiently obvious to have been known to the purchaser. 51 One
would assume, if the principles of equity are working fully, that compliance with
a system of mandatory disclosure of environmental defects would allow one to
assert caveat emptor against a purchaser. "Caveat emptor," which means "let the
buyer beware," has been utilized for ages in real property transactions, especially
where material defects to the property are readily observable.52 As a defense,
caveat emptor completely disallows any recovery to a plaintiff who has had
ample opportunity to examine the item under consideration. Allowing the
defense of caveat emptor creates an incentive for the purchaser to inspect closely
the good being purchased. This incentive is desirable from an equity standpoint
because it promotes a true "meeting of the minds" in transactions, placing the
purchaser and seller on equal terms.
The current concern about hazardous waste, which is almost always
unobservable without inspection, has alerted sophisticated purchasers to the
possibility of its presence. This is especially true if the purchaser is aware that
the seller, or any other previous owner, utilized, stored, or transported hazardous
material. Knowing this, the purchaser should take the necessary steps to
determine the extent of the contamination by inquiring into such matters with
the seller, and by conducting environmental inspections or auditing processes.
The prospective purchaser should then set a price that reflects the value of the
land, given any environmental concerns.53 As stated above, this creates a parity
50. See JOHN WILLARD, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 177 (New York, Banks &
brothers 1875). In contract terms, material nondisclosure could be considered fraudulent inducement or
could allow the purchaser to void the contract on the basis of mistake. Farnsworth discusses the
paradigmatic case where the current homeowner knows his house is infested with termites but does not
inform the prospective buyer:
Courts have been increasingly willing to hold that failure to disclose this fact
amounts to an assertion that it is not riddled with termites. The Restatement
Second recognizes this trend by generally making a party's nondisclosure of a fact
equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist if "he knows that disclosure
of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party as to the basic assumption
on which the party is making the contract."
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 240 (1982).
Courts have generally found no duty of the purchaser to inform the seller of facets of the seller's
land that make it more valuable than the seller believes. Id. at 240-41 (citing Caples v. Steel, 7 Or. 491
(1879); Neill v. Shamburg, 27 A. 992 (1893); Harris v. Tyson, 24 Pa. 347 (1855); and Blair v. National Sec.
Ins. Co., 126 F.2d 955, 958 (3rd Cir. 1942)).
51. Willard wrote, "When the defects are patent, and such as might have been discovered by a
vigilant man, or when the contract was entered into with full knowledge of them, equity will not afford
relief." WILLARD, supra note 50, at 181.
52. "Caveat emptor... summarizes the rule that a purchaser must examine, judge, and test for
himself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 222 (6th ed. 1990).
"Caveat Emptor [is] a maxim of common law expressing the rule that the buyer purchases at his
peril .... The maxim is applicable to sales of real estate in respect of conditions of the premises open
to observation." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 183 (3d ed. 1969).
53. With all the concern for cleaning up hazardous waste sites in recent years, one may correctly
argue that taking away the purchaser's right to sue the seller for cleanup expenses would greatly reduce
the amount of real property transactions in the country. This is not undesirable from a market perspec-
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of knowledge between the two parties. Although the price of the property will
be diminished initially, resulting in fewer willing sellers, the transactions that do
occur will be entered into by parties that have a full understanding of the value
of the property.
The argument is not that caveat emptor should always be used. As stated
above, it should be available to the judge if necessary to avoid inequitable
results, such as double recovery. Although CERCLA provides courts with the
ability to consider the relative equities of a case, the CERCLA cases reviewed
in part VI show that courts are currently uncertain about the place of equity in
determining liability. The next part of this article discusses the effect of
CERCLA on real property transactions. A full understanding of CERCLA's
impact is necessary to illustrate caveat emptor's usefulness.
IV
THE EFFECT OF CERCLA ON COMMERCIAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS
Modern real estate transactions have begun to adjust to the policy of
internalizing the external costs of hazardous waste cleanups. CERCLA increases
the likelihood that these external costs to society will ultimately be shifted to the
parties.'4 Parties involved in real estate transactions are now discussing
environmental costs at the bargaining table. Many recent real estate transaction
guides discuss the necessity of accurate environmental appraisals.55 Test pits,
soil samples, permit reviews, management and employee interviews, and other
environmental auditing procedures are often employed prior to a sale.56
The heightened awareness of CERCLA among commercial real estate
purchasers and sellers is understandable. A 1988 survey conducted by the Roper
Organization indicated that more than sixty percent of those polled viewed the
problem of hazardous waste as very serious.57 Indeed, the problem has been
followed by nearly all media sources that cover local issues. It is reasonable to
assume that commercial real estate purchasers are on notice of the issue.
Further, when attempting to obtain permits from local regulatory agencies,
tive, however. As discussed in Part VI, infra, society currently is involved in too many contaminated
property transactions due to misunderstanding the true value of the property.
54. There is no guarantee, however, that even a clearly contaminated site will be an object of
enforcement by the EPA. The EPA is authorized to bring restitutionary actions against parties for
remedial actions only if the site is on the National Priority List, 42 U.S.C. § 9604, if the site is in need
of response actions due to a release or threatened release, 42 U.S.C. § 9606, or if the EPA issues a
unilateral cleanup order pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9606. Similarly, there is no guarantee that a site will
be cleaned by a private party even though a party may clean and sue for restitution under 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(4)(B).
55. See, e.g., PLI HANDBOOK, supra note 18; A.L.I.-A.B.A. MATERIALS, supra note 18; JOEL S.
MOSKOwrrz, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE
(1989 & Supp. 1992).
56. For environmental analysis techniques and examples, see, e.g., ICC GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING (1991); THOMAS N. TRUIr ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT HANDBOOK:
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AUDITING (2d ed. 1983); and WILLIAM M.
MARSH, ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS FOR LAND USE AND SITE PLANNING (1978).
57. Cited in Dower, supra note 11, at 151-52.
CAVEAT EMPTOR
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
developers should be aware of the issues that local officials face when dealing
with local constituencies. Hazardous waste contamination, while national in
interest, hits hardest at the local level, where drinking water is contaminated, soil
becomes unusable, and people's health is harmed. As local permit-granting
agencies increasingly are held accountable, they are beginning to require cleanup
plans in advance of transactions.5 8
The vast scope of contamination also serves to heighten the public's
awareness of hazardous waste contamination. According to a recent congression-
al study, 250 million metric tons of hazardous waste are produced each year by
some 650,000 generators. 9  Ninety-five percent of the hazardous waste
generated is disposed of on-site, further emphasizing the need for purchasers to
inquire extensively into the past use of the land.' At the time of CERCLA's
enactment, it was estimated that 30,000 to 50,000 sites nationwide contained
hazardous waste, of which 1200 to 2000 presented serious health risks. 61 Today
government agencies disagree about the actual number of hazardous sites: the
EPA lists 27,000 abandoned waste sites, the General Accounting Office reports
that between 130,000 to 425,000 sites need cleanup, and the Office of Technology
Assessment estimates at least 600,000 sites pose a threat to human health and the
environment. 2
While no regulations define the scope of a purchaser's diligence in
investigating commercial property prior to a transaction, many of the guides
available to developers, lawyers, and lenders discuss the potential liability under
CERCLA if the EPA demands a cleanup after the transaction has occurred.'
There are also no regulations promulgated under CERCLA that require the
purchaser to disclose to the seller the details of any environmental assessment
the purchaser may have undertaken on his or her own behalf prior to the
closing.' Still, a purchaser who claims that he or she was unaware of any
contamination on the site prior to purchasing it must have been diligent in his
or her pre-purchase inquiry to assert the innocent owner defense of CERCLA
section 107(b)(3) in a suit for cleanup costs brought by the EPA.65 Knowledge
58. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
59. Of the 650,000 generators, only two percent contribute 95% of the wastes. J. E. MCCARTHY
AND M. E. ANTHONY REISCH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE FACT BOOK,
87-56 ENR (1987), cited in Dower, supra note 11, at 154-55.
60. Id.
61. 1 CERCLA LEG. HIST., supra note 7, at 91.
62. Dower, supra note 11, at 157-58. At least 1087 federal facilities are thought to need cleanup
as well. Id. at 159.
63. See infra note 67.
64. The opposite is not true, however. A variety of liability situations exist for the seller for
nondisclosure of known environmental contamination. See note 50 and accompanying text.
65. Section 107(b)(3) of CERCLA states that there shall be no liability if the party can prove by
a preponderance that the contamination was caused solely by
an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a
contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant ... if
the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised
[Vol. 56: No. 1
Page 149: Winter 1993]
of potential CERCLA liability and the requirements of the innocent purchaser
defense are incentives for investigation by the purchaser. Yet, without the
defense of caveat emptor, no such incentives encourage disclosure by the seller.
Although the common law indicates that there is no general duty to disclose
known hazards,' CERCLA itself is facially silent on the issue.
Perhaps because of this silence, some states regulate the conditions that must
be met before a transfer can occur; most simply require disclosure, recording of
environmental conditions, or both.67 New Jersey's Environmental Cleanup
Responsibility Act' is "recognized as creating the most potent weapon for
environmental enforcement of this kind."69  It mandates that no industrial
property is to be transferred until the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection is satisfied that the property is free of contamination.
Even absent state regulation, the principles of caveat emptor-seller
disclosure and purchaser inspection-have been incorporated in real property
transactions in clever ways despite some courts' proscription of it as a complete
defense. One such incorporation is the use of indemnification clauses' between
due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consid-
eration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts
and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequence that could foreseeably
result from such acts or omissions.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). The purchaser/new owner will be considered to be in a contractual relationship
with the seller/old owner, by virtue of the sales agreement, if the purchaser knew of the contamination,
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A), or if he or she did not make adequate inquiry into previous uses at the time
of the transaction, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(35)(B). This will invalidate the purchaser's ability to defend against
liability should the purchaser be sued.
66. See supra note 51.
67. The Illinois Responsible Property Transfer Act, Pub. Act 85-1228, requires that the seller give
to the purchaser an environmental disclosure document that, in turn, requires the seller to answer a
series of questions related to on-site activities. The Act requires the document to be given to the
purchaser no later than 30 days before the transfer. The Act also requires the document to be recorded.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 901 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
Massachusetts law requires any discharge, spill, or hazardous waste disposal to be recorded in the
registry of deeds prior to the conveyance of property. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21C, § 7 (West 1979
& Supp. 1992).
Minnesota requires an affidavit to be filed with the recording office before the conveyance of any
property that the owner knows or should have known was used as a hazardous waste disposal facility.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.16 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992).
Pennsylvania requires the seller to acknowledge, in the description portion of the deed, the
elements of the hazardous waste disposal that is occurring or has occurred. The Pennsylvania Solid
Waste Management Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6018.405 (Supp. 1992). See also W. VA. CODE
§ 20-5E-20 (1989). These statutes are briefly described in Donald W. Stever, ECRA and Other
Restrictions on the Transfer of Hazardous Waste Sites, reprinted in PLI HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at
166-69.
68. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lk-6 to -35 (West 1991).
69. Stever, supra note 67, at 170.
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e). One case that dealt with indemnification for private party response
costs under CERCLA § 107 was Emhart Industries, Inc. v. Duracell International, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 549
(M.D. Tenn. 1987). In Emhart, the plaintiff, Emhart Industries, bought the Mallory Components Group
from defendant Duracell, a subsidiary of Dart Industries, Inc. During negotiations, plaintiff learned of
polychlorinated biphenyl, or PCB, contamination on the site of one the manufacturing plants considered
for purchase. The parties bargained for and accepted intricate contractual provisions that required the
defendants to remove the PCB contamination and to indemnify the plaintiffs on all claims, obligations,
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sellers and purchasers. 71 Courts have held that contracts to indemnify sellers
against CERCLA liability must do so specifically.' As indicated in Part VI(B),
indemnification clauses function to incorporate the principles of caveat emptor
expressly into contracts.
CERCLA liability, as with liability under most major legal instruments, has
transformed the market in which it operates. The next part of this article argues
that allowing the equitable defense of caveat emptor will result not only in
greater fairness to the parties, but also in greater market efficiency.
V
REMOVING THE CONTAMINATED PROPERTY MARKET DISTORTION
The primary goal of welfare economics is to determine whether any given
market allocates its scarce resources efficiently in relation to the personal wants
of the members of the relevant society.73 For a market to allocate resources
efficiently, it is necessary that "all participants in the market are fully infonned
as to the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of goods and services and the
terms of exchange., 74 In the words of famed welfare economist A.C. Pigou,
and attorneys' fees arising out of "[a]ny obligation, liability, loss, damage or expense... pertaining to
health, safety or environmental protection and arising out of any act or omission by Seller." 665 F. Supp.
at 555. The court upheld the agreement, and held the defendant liable for the cleanup (except that
portion that was found to be attributed to plaintiff's activities). Id at 574.
The seller's indemnification and warranty involved in Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270
(N.D. Ill. 1990) claimed that the property had no "liabilities... known or unknown" and that the seller
agreed to indemnify the purchaser against "any loss, damage or expense.., suffered as a result of any
inaccuracy in or any breach of any of the representations.., made by Defendant." Id. at 276-77. The
defendant moved to dismiss liability on the instrument based on the fact that the defendant gave the
warranty before the passage of CERCLA and was thus not aware of CERCLA's potential for inclusion
under the terms of the agreement. The court denied the motion to dismiss, citing the fact that plaintiff's
interpretation of the clause to include all possible future liability was not "an 'impossible' one." Id at
277.
71. These agreements may not be as socially desirable as they seem, however, because the buyer
who achieves indemnification against liability for contamination does not have an automatic claim of
restitution against the seller for cleanups that it undertakes of its own accord. Rather, the buyer is
protected against loss when sued. The buyer therefore has incentive not to incur the expenses of a
voluntary cleanup. A cleanup is more apt to occur if the buyer bargains the price down to reflect the
future costs of its cleanup plan.
72. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 516 (Wash. 1990); Southland
Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1000-01 (D.N.J. 1988) (discussed in Part VI.B, infra).
73. ALLEN V. KNEESE, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 18-19 (1977). See also JOSEPH J.
SENECA & MICHAEL K. TAUSSIG, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 24 (4th ed. 1984) ("Social efficiency
is not measured by aggregating physical quantities of goods and services ... but rather by somehow
aggregating the subjective values placed on different goods and services by individual consumer units.");
EDWIN S. MILLS, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 68 (1978) ("The value judgment
almost always used by economists is that an economic system's performance is to be judged by its ability
to satisfy the needs and wants of people as they perceive them."); PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS
591 (11th ed. 1980); EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 458-59 (5th
ed. 1985).
74. KNEESE, supra note 73, at 19. See also White, supra note 8, at 915 ("The market pricing
mechanism tends to reflect both the degree of the consumers' desire for the product and the extent of
society's resources used to produce it. If a commodity is very costly to produce, then its price should
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[a] flowing stream of resources is continually coming into being and struggling, so far as
unavoidable costs of movement allow of this, to distribute itself away from points of
relatively low returns towards points of relatively high returns. Success in this struggle
is interfered with by imperfect knowledge on the part of those in whose hands the power
to direct the various branches of the stream resides. 5
Society, by allocating resources in one market incorrectly, loses the opportunity
to use them in another; "[e]fficient resource allocation means that more of one
commodity can be produced only by reducing the output of another commodi-
ty."q76 Although perceived short term efficiency may initially result, lack of full
information on the part of the choice making consumer will result in resource
allocation that is divergent from the true desires of the consuming public.'
This divergence creates an "external diseconomy" or "market distortion," so
called because the market over or under buys based on an incorrect accounting
of true costs.
78
This distortion is exemplified by the many sales transactions of hazardous
waste contaminated properties in which the existence of the waste was unknown
to at least one of the parties. In making economic decisions, parties have failed
to consider the hidden costs of future cleanup. Due to this failure, parties often
underestimate the true cost of the transaction and ultimately engage in more
than the optimal number of transactions.
79
To assess the true costs of an activity to society, an economist must consider
not only direct and transaction costs,' but also externalities. Generally,
externalities are costs that are allocated to society but are not considered by a
firm during production.81 A firm engaged in production, if allowed to ignore
the environmental effects of production, will likely produce its individual optimal
level of output while surpassing the level of output optimal to society." This
pattern of production ultimately results in inefficient allocation of society's
resources. In order to optimize societal allocation of resources, a government
may act to correct the market distortion. By assigning liability for this
reflect that cost, to ensure that the consumers' desire (which is reflected in the price they are willing to
pay) is sufficiently high to warrant the production of such an expensive item.").
75. A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 149 (4th ed. 1932).
76. THOMAS M. CARROLL, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 638 (1983).
77. SAMUELSON, supra note 73, at 449, 743-44; MANSFIELD, supra note 73, at 496.
78. See White, supra note 8, at 916-17.
79. MANSFIELD, supra note 73, at 476. This article assumes that this failure will have no effect on
the overall amount of property that is remediated.
80. Transaction costs are those costs that the parties incur to facilitate the deal but are not
considered costs of production, manufacture, or of substantive business. See MANSFIELD, supra note 73,
at 264-66; RICHARD G. LIPSEY, PETER 0. STEINER & DOUGLAS D. PURVIS, ECONOMICS 438 (7th ed.
1984); CARROLL, supra note 76, at 309-12.
81. SENECA & TAUSSIG, supra note 73, at 26-39; SAMUELSON, supra note 73, at 743-47;
MANSFIELD, supra note 73, at 495-96; MILLS, supra note 73, at 78-83; CARROLL, supra note 76, at 640.
See also DANIEL ORR, PROPERTY, MARKETS, AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 285-311 (1976).
82. MANSFIELD, supra note 73, at 499 ("Left to its own devices, the industry... will not reduce
its pollution level [to the optimal amount], because it does not pay all of the social costs of its
pollution.") See also SAMUELSON, supra note 73, at 449-50.
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externality to the responsible party, the government internalizes the
externality.'
In discussing several cases in which it is most efficient for the government
to tax a behavior that creates an externality, Pigou cites the example of
intoxicating liquors.' The government, he says, ought to tax (set the price
above the cost to produce the good plus a reasonable profit) alcoholic beverages
to pay for the increased need for police and prisons that accompanies increased
consumption of alcohol. Like hazardous waste producers, producers of alcohol
would not, in the absence of such a tax, account for the added social cost when
determining what quantity of the good to produce. Not only will the tax
revenues provide for the needed government service (whether police, prisons, or
hazardous waste cleanups), but they will also create market pressures that will
force the producer and the consumer to assess the social cost of the item
accurately.'
This type of government imposed internalization has affected the market for
commercial property sales. The effect of internalization on the commercial real
estate market is measured by changes in the number of transactions, rather than
in the amount of production. Prior to the development of environmental liability
laws that held the causal agent of pollution externalities responsible, the market
for commercial real estate had not internally adjusted to accommodate the
pollution externality. The price asked by sellers in the market was, therefore,
lower than the true equilibrium price, leading to more property transactions than
would have occurred at the true equilibrium output level.' Because these
83. CARROLL, supra note 76, at 640. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4. Nobel laureate
Ronald Coase has put forward a model that illustrates how externalities may be internalized by the
perfectly competitive market economy without government regulation. If transaction costs are minimal,
the party that desires less production by the polluter (those harmed by the pollution) will compensate
the producer to produce less. The first party will continue to compensate the producer until its marginal
benefit for the reduction of production is outweighed by the marginal benefit of the producer to produce
the next unit. In other words, at some point, the first party will not be willing to pay the producer more
than what she could get at market to produce the next unit. This is the optimal welfare level for society,
according to Coase, because the marginal benefits of production are equal to the marginal benefits of
non-production. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). While the
importance of this theory cannot be overstated, for externalities that involve all members of a
community, such as hazardous wastes, transaction costs will serve to make the Coase theory irrelevant.
See MANSFIELD, supra note 73, at 503.
84. PIGOU, supra note 75, at 186.
85. Id.
86. The concepts of equilibrium price and quantity, while difficult to define tersely, have been
described by Mansfield as follows:
Let us define the consumer's equilibrium behavior as a course of action that will
not be changed by him or her in favor of some other course of action, if the
consumer's money income, tastes, and the prices he or she faces remain the same.
Then the consumer's equilibrium behavior will be to choose the market basket
that maximizes his or her utility.
MANSFIELD, supra note 73, at 54. Samuelson describes the concepts in this manner:
The equilibrium price[:] the only price that can last, in that at which the amount
willingly supplied and the amount willingly demanded are equal. Competitive
equilibrium must be at the intersection point of supply and demand curves.
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excess property sales proved to be more expensive than originally believed, the
purchasers had effectively purchased more than they would have wanted were
they possessed of full information, creating a market distortion. As a byproduct
of CERCLA, remediation costs are accounted for before they are incurred,
removing this distortion.
A system of disclosure from the seller to the purchaser of all known
environmental defects, followed by diligent inspection by the purchaser, will
result in a transaction with full information. By adding the additional cost of
cleanup expenses into the body of knowledge held by the parties in a real
property transaction, the market for real property will eliminate the current
distortion. Some investors will avoid the real property market due to its
increased costs, and place their resources in other markets better reflecting their
true desires, raising the overall welfare of society. Applying the principles of
caveat emptor to the market for real property transactions thus makes sense
economically, as well as equitably.
VI
COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF CERCLA AND EQUITABLE DEFENSES
Possibly due to the haste-created ambiguity with which CERCLA was
written, the facial proscription of nonenumerated (that is, equitable) defenses to
liability in section 107 has been subject to incongruous judicial interpretation.
In general, courts follow one of two extreme approaches. The courts that follow
the first approach believe that section 107's proscription is absolute, excluding
not only possible legal defenses, but also equitable defenses, ensuring liability for
all in the causal chain. Among the courts that utilize this approach, some allow
caveat emptor and other equitable defenses only in the contribution phase. The
second approach argues that the equitable nature of CERCLA requires that
traditional equitable defenses be available to courts of equity. Some courts
adhering to this approach reason that courts of equity maintain this status unless
equitable remedies are expressly disallowed. Others hold that CERCLA confers
general equitable powers onto the court while specifically providing for legal
remedies and defenses in other sections. Each of these approaches is discussed
in turn.
A. Cases Disallowing Equitable Defenses to CERCLA Liability
The leading case espousing the first approach considered whether a seller can
assert caveat emptor against a sophisticated commercial purchaser. In Smith
SAMUELSON, supra note 73, at 57.
The use of the term "true" to modify the equilibrium output and price level indicates that the
parties' subjective knowledge of the costs differs from the real cost that will be incurred by them. This
article assumes that it is possible to determine the parties' equilibrium levels even if they are unaware
of the true costs.
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Land and Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.,3 the purchaser sought
contribution from the seller's successor for expenses incurred in connection with
a cleanup of on-site wastes, including asbestos.' The court stated that
the plaintiff's predecessor was a sophisticated company which had inspected the
land on five occasions, known of its past use, and admitted that the pile of waste
was a "negative" factor in the decision to purchase the land. Despite the
plaintiff's assertion that it lacked knowledge about the hazards of asbestos, the
[district] court concluded that the "grice plaintiff paid for the land reflected the
possibility of environmental risks."
The court of appeals, however, stated that despite the purchaser's awareness
of the hazard and the subsequent mark down in price, caveat emptor was not
available as a defense in the liability phase of a CERCLA action.' The court
relied on the language91 of section 107(a), which states that liability shall attach
to certain parties for certain costs "subject only to the defenses set forth in
subsection (b) . . . ." The defenses of subsection (b) are policy decisions that
reflect issues of causation such as the intervention of an act of God, an act of
war, or of an act entirely caused by an unrelated third party that was uncontrol-
lable by the party, while the party took reasonable precautions against the
action.'
While recognizing that certain equitable principles coexisted with the three
enumerated defenses to liability, the court of appeals first reasoned that caveat
emptor would create a disincentive for private parties to clean their sites quickly.
Private cleanups would be unlikely, the court stated, as new owners (purchasers)
would await a legal ruling of apportionment before actually cleaning the sites.93
This policy justification is insufficient, however, because, as the court itself
mentioned earlier in its decision, the EPA can order parties to clean the sites
immediately under section 106.94
Despite citing a segment of the legislative history that states that equitable
considerations are to be considered alongside the three express defenses of the
87. 851 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1988).
88. As occurs in many private party cleanups, EPA here warned Smith Land that if it did not
remediate the site, the federal government would do so. Id. at 87; see also CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606.
89. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 88.
90. Id. at 90. The court did say that the principles of caveat emptor may be available in
apportioning costs in a contribution proceeding. CERCLA itself mandates that courts, during the
contribution proceedings, allocate expenses "among liable parties using such equitable factors as the
court determines are appropriate." CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
91. Like the court in Smith Land, the court in United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053,
1062 (C.D. Cal. 1987), found CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607, to deny other defenses based on the
"plain meaning" of the language used.
92. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
93. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 90.
94. One commentator notes that private parties have a strong incentive to clean without the EPA's
involvement because once the EPA names a party as a PRP, it is likely that the party will be initially
(jointly and severally) liable for all of the EPA's costs-even those allocated to parties that it cannot
find. An initially liable PRP can recover only the shares positively attributed to other parties it sues for
contribution. As such, the costs attributed to unknown parties go unreimbursed. Yvette Gonzales, Note,
The Best Equitable Defense is a Good Offense, 29 NAT. REs. J. 849, 858 (1989).
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liability section (section 107),"' the court rejected equitable defenses to liability,
such as caveat emptor and "unclean hands," because, paradoxically, they would
be inequitable in the context of environmental cleanups. Rather than preclude
any recovery by the purchaser as in caveat emptor, the court concluded that it
was equitable at the contribution phase to reduce the seller's financial burden by
the discount that was bargained for in light of the potential for environmental
problems.
The Smith Land court feared that, if caveat emptor and "unclean hands"
were allowed as defenses to liability, a purchaser might be liable for a much
greater share of the cleanup cost than is equitable. This reasoning fails to
consider four aspects of real property transactions that stand to justify caveat
emptor as a complete defense: (1) only the purchaser (the new owner) will
benefit from a clean site when the property is reassessed or sold; (2) an
important aspect of a free market is that the parties to a transaction may value
the risks however they choose; (3) the knowledge that it will not be able to
recover from the seller will force the purchaser to evaluate the environmental
status of the land thoroughly before the transaction to ensure that the price
reflects the true costs of the property;' and (4) caveat emptor and unclean
hands can be defenses for the seller only if the seller has acted reasonably and
honestly.' In the absence of a statute requiring disclosure of hazardous waste,
caveat emptor, as a complete defense for private party property sellers, may be
helpful in mandating such disclosure. To take advantage of the defense, the
seller would be required to disclose all known hazardous waste information to
the purchaser before closing the transaction. Certainly, sellers would be
attracted to a system where their potential liability is limited from the time the
transaction is concluded.
In United States v Kramer,98 another case following the first approach, the
court concluded that "consideration of 'equitable factors' only comes into play
during the contribution phase and does not affect the liability of each defendant
in a section 107 action."" Kramer, unlike Smith Land, was brought by the
government, rather than a private plaintiff The government sought to strike
95. H.R. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 80 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,
2862 ("Although the only defenses to liability remain those set forth in Section [107(b)], courts are to
resolve such claims on a case-by-case basis, taking into account relevant equitable considerations.").
96. The court in Smith Land recognized "[t]he duty of inspection implicit in caveat emptor ... 
Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 90 n.1. It felt that this was embodied in the text of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B),
where a landowner is relieved from "initial liability on proof that after 'all appropriate inquiry ...
consistent with good commercial or customary practice' the owner had no reason to know of the
presence of a hazardous substance." Id. This is not an apposite statement, however, as § 9601(35)(B)
concerns an owner of land attempting to avoid liability as an owner/operator, as that term is used in §
9607(a). Caveat emptor attempts to apportion liability to the correct party among more than one PRP.
The act of inspection, under caveat emptor, is not utilized by the landowner to avoid liability; it is done
by the land purchaser to insure that all costs, however hidden, are accounted for in the purchase price.
97. This is inherent in the maxims that "He who seeks equity must do equity" and "He who comes
in equity must come with clean hands." See supra note 45.
98. 757 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1991).
99. Id. at 413.
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approximately 200 of some 300 affirmative defenses not expressly listed in
section 107(b), set forth in the answers of sixteen of the twenty-nine existing
defendants named as PRPs at the Helen Kramer Landfill in Mantua, NewJersey."°
As in Smith Land, the court in Kramer barred the application of equitable
principles during the liability phase but considered application possible during
the contribution phase. 1' The defendants protested that it was irrelevant to
the disposition of the case whether they asserted their equitable defense during
the former or the latter proceeding."° Stating that all parties are jointly and
severally liable if the harm is indivisible, the court found that affirmative
defenses, other than those in section 107(b), are appropriate only in the
contribution phase, and then only if the harm at the site is divisible.
The defendants, using a novel approach, attempted to collapse the distinction
between the section 107 liability phase and the section 113 contribution phase by
stating that they intended to name the government as a contributor; thus the
defendants claimed that the action was really one of contribution between the
government and the defendants. As this would ultimately be a section 113
contribution claim, the defendants argued, equitable defenses to liability should
be allowed. 3 The court disagreed with this reasoning, stating that CERCLA
requires the government to bring actions against defendant PRPs who will be
jointly and severally liable, leaving to the PRPs the right of contribution against
third-party defendants, who will be only severally liable. The government, said
the court, can be brought in only during the contribution phase, and can be held
to pay only those costs directly related to its share of the contamination."
Thus, under Kramer, the government is not responsible for paying the portion
of the costs attributable to parties that were not solvent or locatable at the time
of the litigation. This is consistent with the policy concerns of preserving
government funds for other cleanups where no PRP has been found and for
100. Id. at 404. Aside from equitable defenses, the defendants also listed constitutional defenses
that could not be preempted by CERCLA, defenses under other sections of CERCLA, and the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1988), which they claimed should be allowed under
CERCLA § 107 as necessary to the implementation of CERCLA as a whole, and defenses arising against
the government itself as a generator of hazardous substances. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 404-05.
101. Id. at 412-13.
102. Id. at 405. In support of the defendants, the ability of the PRPs to defend on liability before
defending on contribution will have a great effect on the transaction costs a defendant incurs, as it may
effect the disposition of the case through cost-pressured settlement. The government responded to the
PRPs' claim by stating that, on summary judgment, an affirmative defense can eliminate the defendant
entirely from the proceeding. This is a great concern for the government, which would then have to pay
for the cleanup out of the Hazardous Substance Superfund. The distinction between government suits
and private party suits between a seller and a buyer is significant, however, and requires consideration
of the inefficient redundant transaction costs that inevitably accompany a bifurcated trial. A blanket
pronouncement against all equitable considerations during the liability stage is inappropriate.
103. Id. at 412-13. The reported decision does not indicate that the defendants addressed the issue
of potentially increased transaction costs due to a failure of the court to consider equitable factors during
the liability phase.
104. Id. at 414. See generally Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 41 (discussing whether several-only
contribution leads to efficient results).
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limiting the direct involvement of taxpayers. The court did state, however, that
the government, like any other PRP, can be named as a joint and several
defendant if a private party initiated the cleanup and is seeking restitution. 5
According to the court, "it would be 'anomalous' to permit apportionment
of cleanup costs among PRPs in a section 113 action and not to permit
apportionment in a section 107 action, but only if defendants in a section 107
action could not seek contribution in a section 113 action.' '""l Since CERCLA
does allow for consideration of equitable factors in a section 113 action, the court
concluded that there is no need to be concerned about apportionment during the
liability phase. This dicta could presumably be interpreted to allow apportion-
ment during the section 107 liability phase in actions where section 113
contribution actions might not exist-as may occur when a private party
purchaser/owner, who has found shelter in the innocent landowner provision of
section 107(b)(3), sues to recover from a seller/former owner.
Yet this dicta may also allow double recovery for the plaintiff/owner. For
example, assume that an owner/purchaser who reduced her offering price to
protect against potential remediation requirements sues a seller for actual
cleanup costs. Although not discovered until after the purchase, assume that
these costs would have been apparent upon a more thorough inspection prior to
the purchase. After Kramer, the seller/defendant is required to bring a
contribution suit against the owner/purchaser under section 113 to assert the
caveat emptor defense. CERCLA section 113(f)(1) states that "[a]ny person may
seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under
section 9607(a) [107(a)]." ' If the plaintiff/owner was diligent in inquiring into
the status of the land, found no contamination at the time of the inquiry, and
had not causally contributed to the contamination of the site, he or she could
avoid liability under section 107(a) by virtue of the innocent owner defense of
section 107(b)(3).
The innocent landowners, then, will not be subject to the "equitable factors
[that] the court determines are appropriate" under section 113." Indeed,
under the Smith Land and Kramer decisions, a purchaser/owner who can
successfully invoke section 107(b)(3) will not be subject to the forces of
equity-although the purchaser/owner may have reduced the purchase price to
reflect potential, although unrecognized, environmental exposure. Even if a
court finds some way to bring the purchaser into a contribution proceeding and
allows the purchaser's restitution to be offset by the benefit of the bargain, the
seller is forced to incur extra transaction costs in the form of legal fees."°
105. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 414.
106. Id. at 416.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (emphasis added). See also Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270,
274 (N.D. 11. 1990) ("Quadion may seek such contribution only if defendants are persons 'who [are]
liable or potentially liable' under the Act.").
108. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
109. Legal fees in cleanup cases can be astonishing. In one instance, a plaintiff amassed $419,000
worth of attorneys' fees in order to recover $940,000 restitution. General Electric v. Litton Industrial
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Also, the risks assumed by the parties in the bargained for sale and the
assessment of the potential for environmental exposure are disregarded, and the
seller is essentially converted into an unwitting insurer for the purchaser.
Hinting at a way to mitigate the transaction costs of a bifurcated process, the
Kramer court pointed out that there is no need to suffer a delay in recovering
contribution, as section 107 and section 113 actions can be concurrent.
A private PRP could be in the same posture as the government here, seeking
recovery of its past response costs and a declaratory judgment under section
113(g)(2) that named defendant PRPs are liable for all future response costs.
Thus the plaintiff PRP might not have financed or performed the entire cleanup
at the time of bringing the section 107 suit. This does not, however, undercut
the purpose in creating the incentive for private PRPs to clean up hazardous
waste sites, which is to expedite cleanup. Nor does it increase any windfall to
section 107 plaintiffs who have rushed in to clean up the contamination, because
they are only reimbursed for monies already spent, and can be found liable for
their equitable share of future response costs in a section 113 action."0
The court also addressed the claims made in several district court cases'
that, due to CERCLA's restitutionary nature, equitable defenses are inherent in
section 107 actions:
While it may be logical to permit equitable defenses in an inherently equitable
proceeding, and sections 106 and 113 both permit equitable considerations, the
clear answer for section 107 is that Congress explicitly limited the defenses
available to only those three provided in section 107(b)."'
Finally, the court concluded that, since Smith Land found caveat emptor and
unclean hands inappropriate as complete defenses in section 113 claims, they are
also inappropriate in section 107 claims.'
A third decision denying caveat emptor as a complete defense, Southland
Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc.,14 attempted to distinguish between caveat emptor,
on the one hand, and indemnification and "hold harmless" agreements that
expressly refer to CERCLA liability, on the other. The Southland court
accepted Smith Land, but then proceeded to permit what is essentially an express
caveat emptor clause to act as a complete defense to CERCLA liability.
In Southland, a private party plaintiff, who purchased the subject property
two years before the enactment of CERCLA, sued the former owner to gain a
declaration of the latter's liability for expenses incurred in determining the extent
of the contamination and for future cleanup costs. The environmental condition
of the land was well known, at least to the New Jersey Department of
Automation Systems, 920 F.2d 1415, 1417 (8th Cir. 1990).
110. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 416 n.18.
111. United States v. Conservation Chemical, 619 F. Supp. 162, 204-06 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Violet v.
Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1294-95 (D.R.I. 1986), overruled by United States v. Davis, No. 90-0484, 1992
WL 159897 (D.R.I. June 22, 1992); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1056 n.9 (D.
Ariz. 1984); and United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 626-27 (D.N.H. 1988).
112. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 427.
113. Id. at 428.
114. 696 F. Supp. 994 (D.N.J. 1988).
[Vol. 56: No. 1
Page 149: Winter 1993] CAVEAT EMPTOR 173
Environmental Protection, which became aware of the site's problems as early
as 1968, ten years before the purchase." 5
The defendant, while admitting responsibility for the contamination,
attempted to defend against liability by claiming that the parties had allocated
liability between them in the purchase agreement. 16 The court upheld this
type of contractual defense, citing CERCLA section 107(e)(1), which states that
"[n]othing in this subsection shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or
indemnify a party to such agreement for any liability under this section."'7
The court distinguished this case from Smith Land, despite citing it favorably, by
asserting that the latter proscribed only caveat emptor and was silent on the issue
of indemnification and "hold harmless" agreements.
118
In Southland, the court allowed the seller to assert a contract provision as a
defense even though this defense is not expressly enumerated in section 107(b).
In fact, the defense allowed was similar to caveat emptor in that the parties
agreed to shift the potential for future liability to the purchaser. This agreement
presumably involved valuations of the contract price based, in part, on the risk
of future liability. The purchaser's indemnification and "hold harmless" agree-
ments were merely express caveat emptor clauses.
To follow the decision in Smith Land faithfully, however, the Southland court
would have had to accept its reasoning that the structure of CERCLA itself
could not fairly allow a causally responsible party to utilize any defense, other
than one enumerated in section 107(b). By accepting contractual defenses to
liability that are not enumerated in section 107(b), Southland implicitly rejects
Smith Land.119
In Westwood Pharmaceuticals v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp.,2' the
plaintiff purchased from the defendant a parcel of land in 1972-also before
CERCLA and SARA-for $60,100. This site had been used for industrial
purposes and to store industrial materials for over 100 years when the plaintiff
acquired it."' Although the decision reports that the plaintiff first became
aware of on-site, petroleum-based contamination when it began digging test pits
and taking soil borings in relation to its own construction efforts after the
purchase, the sales contract allowed plaintiff the right to inspect the premises
prior to closing the transaction."
115. Id. at 996-97.
116. Id. at 1000.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1). The court wrote, "Under this provision, parties remain accountable for
any costs incurred in a government-instituted cleanup, regardless of conveyance or transfer; however,
between private parties, they retain the freedom to contract out of CERCLA liability." Southland, 696
F. Supp. at 1000.
118. Southland, 696 F. Supp. at 1000.
119. Ultimately, the defendant's contractual defense failed in that the transaction agreement did not
include "an express provision which allocates [CERCLA] risks to one of the parties." Id. at 1002.
120. 737 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
121. Id. at 1275.
122. Id. at 1275-76.
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The defendant attempted to persuade the court that it had a defense of
caveat emptor based on the belief that the "extremely low contract price
'presumably' reflected the parties' understanding that, under New York law,
National Fuel would not be liable to Westwood for any condition of the
property."" 3  Beyond simply accepting the reasoning of Smith Land, the
Westwood court criticized the defendant's argument of caveat emptor, calling it
"fundamental[ly] unfair[]" that the plaintiff would bargain away "its right to bring
an action based on statutes such as CERCLA and SARA that were not in
existence at the time of the conveyance." 4 The court, however, indicated that
it might consider caveat emptor under circumstances in which the conveyance
occurred after the enactment of CERCLA.125
B. Cases Allowing Equitable Defenses to CERCLA Liability
As discussed above, the Westwood court indicated that it might consider the
defense of caveat emptor in certain cases where the transaction occurred after
CERCLA's enactment, distinguishing the Westwood defendant's use of caveat
emptor from its use by the defendant in Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.126
In Mardan, prior to bringing a subsequent CERCLA suit, the defendant/seller
entered into a settlement with the plaintiff/owner for $995,000, $781,055 of which
reflected claims arising out of the purchase agreement.127 Prior to closing the
transaction, the defendant notified the EPA that there was an area of hazardous
waste contamination on its site. The EPA, subsequent to the transaction,
ordered the plaintiff-at that point the new owner and a contributor of waste in
its own right-to remediate the area, prompting the plaintiff to sue the defendant
for reimbursement under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B). The district court
found that the plaintiff was barred from recovery under CERCLA based on both
the contractual release given to the defendant by the plaintiff in conjunction with
the settlement and by the doctrine of unclean hands."2  The district court
justified the latter finding by reasoning that because section 107(a)'s form of
liability offers equitable restitution, the equitable defense "is applicable in a
private cost recovery action under CERCLA. '' 129 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the result based solely on the contractual release, never
reaching the issue of the validity of the equitable defense under section
107(a). 13
123. Id. at 1280.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1280-81.
126. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
127. Id. at 1456.
128. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1056-58 (D. Ariz. 1984).
129. Id. at 1058. The court stated that the application of this doctrine would not defeat the intent
and purpose of CERCLA because defendants would remain liable to government entities, who are
barred neither by contract nor by equitable defenses.
130. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1457. Courts have generally not looked favorably upon the defense of
"unclean hands." See Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Industries, 669 F. Supp. 1285,
1291 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("the 'unclean hands' doctrine... has no place in CERCLA actions"); see also
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In contrast to Smith Land, Kramer, and Westwood, United States v.
Mottolo131 permitted equitable defenses. In Mottolo, the government sought
restitution for cleanup expenditures related to Mottolo's Raymond, New
Hampshire site. One defendant argued that it took "due care" with its hazardous
waste, asserting "it was unaware of the location to which its hazardous wastes
were being taken. ' 132 The court found such behavior was not usually consid-
ered "due care." According to the court, "the argument is irrelevant given
[CERCLA's] strict and explicit limitation of available defenses .... CERCLA
section 107(b) does not include a defense based on lack of knowledge., 133
Despite this reasoning, the court maintained that the preclusion of equitable
defenses under section 107 "is both contrary to equitable principles and
unwarranted by CERCLA's statutory language."" The court reasoned that
CERCLA's equitable remedy of restitution should permit assertions of equitable
defenses-"due care" not being one of the allowable defenses.
The court also looked to section 101(32), which provides that CERCLA's
liability scheme was meant to parallel that of section 311 of the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). 135  The court followed the Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger
v. Romero-Barcelo,1 36 which addressed the issue of whether federal district
courts, specifically empowered by the CWA to order fines and criminal penalties,
could continue to order injunctions under equitable powers not specifically
provided for by the Act. 137 The Supreme Court, in upholding a district court's
ability to enjoin violative behavior under the CWA, stated,
[Eiquitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear
and valid legislative command. Unless a statute in so many words, or by a
necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity,
the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. "The great
principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light
inferences, or doubtful construction.""
General Electric Company v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990),
in which defendants attempted to assert a causation argument that the court transformed into an
.unclean hands" argument. The defendants argued that G.E. was suing them only because they were
attempting to sell their property to a developer, and the developer had threatened suit against G.E. The
defendant also claimed that its hazardous wastes did not "cause" G.E.'s response, but rather the threat
of a suit did. Also, the defendants asserted that G.E. was barred from bringing an action against them
because they knew about the contamination in 1980 and did not disclose it to the developer until 1984.
The court held that CERCLA § 107 does not allow for the unclean hands defense, as it only allows for
the enumerated defenses in § 107(b). Likewise, it is also the case that Litton could not have asserted
the defense because the non-disclosure was taken against the developer, a completely separate party, and
not against Litton.
131. 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988).
132. Id. at 626.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32); see 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988).
136. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
137. At least one court has ruled that states do not have the power to issue an injunction under
CERCLA § 107. State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1049 (2d Cir. 1985) (implying
that if § 107 is interpreted to contain injunctive ability like that expressly provided for in §106, it would
render the specific phrase in § 106 "surplusage").
138. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. at 627, quoting Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
The Mottolo court interpreted the Weinberger decision to mean that whenever
equitable jurisdiction is not expressly removed, courts of equity will have
recourse to its remedies.
The issue as applied to CERCLA section 107 is not that simple, however.
First, it is not clear that Congress did not take away the equitable jurisdiction of
the courts. Its statement that liability is "subject only to the defenses set forth
in [section 107(b)]" does not, at least facially, deny or assert the notion of equity.
Second, some courts and commentators maintain that CERCLA's form of
restitution is not the same as the traditional form. 139 It is also not clear that
Congress was aware that this remedy would be considered by courts to be
restitutionary, and thus equitable. Third, as the Kramer court emphasized,
Weinberger dealt with a statute that did not specifically proscribe injunctions,
whereas CERCLA specifically limits "defenses."1" The Mottolo court reasoned
that Congress would have included the term "equitable defenses" in its list of
proscribed defenses if it had wanted to preclude them. The Kramer court, on the
other hand, reasoned that the express limitation of defenses to those in section
107(b) implied that no other defenses could be asserted.141
Some of these issues were addressed by a different district court in United
States v. Conservation Chemical.142  The court prefaced its discussion of
equitable remedies by stating that section 107 was merely meant to be Congress's
declaration of CERCLA's liability standard. The court then declared the
standard of liability to be the same as section 311 of the CWA143 and specifical-
ly interpreted the legislative history of CERCLA to indicate that that standard
was strict liability, even though Congress at the last moment had decided against
expressly including the term "strict liability" in section 107. The court reasoned
that the express defenses listed in CERCLA section 107(b) were placed there to
indicate the only conduct-based defenses available to escape strict liability (as
opposed to enacting a more lenient conduct-based standard such as negligence
to the handling of hazardous waste).1" The court continued by noting that
139. Even though there is debate concerning the nature of the type of restitution involved in
CERCLA, it is well resolved that CERCLA restitution is, like other restitutionary actions, equitable.
This issue has been resolved by the many decisions declaring that there is no right to a jury trial for
CERCLA actions for cost reimbursement. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chemical, 619 F.
Supp. 162, 205 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (citing cases supporting this proposition).
140. United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 424-25 (D.N.J. 1991).
141. The Stringfellow court, like the Kramer court, found that "section 107(a) provides the restrictive
words referred to by the [Weinberger] Court." United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1062
(C.D. Cal. 1987).
142. 619 F. Supp. at 203.
143. 33 U.S.C. § 1321.
144. It is possible that Congress wanted to avoid the term "strict liability" because of its association
with "ultrahazardous activity." Certain chemicals may not be considered ultrahazardous when they are
first disposed of, only to be deemed so at a later date. CERCLA's brand of strict liability was meant
to reach the responsible party, regardless of whether the party could have known its behavior was
ultrahazardous or not. Some versions of strict liability may take into account whether the act was
considered ultrahazardous at the time it occurred.
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"[t]he provision of a strict liability standard in a statute does not mean that legal
or equitable defenses cannot be asserted.,
145
It next declared that CERCLA restitution is equitable in nature because
parties are seeking restitution for costs "spent on behalf of others' legal
obligation to clean up hazardous waste."'" In concluding that "[e]quitable
defenses are proper under CERCLA in determining liability," the court reasoned
that since equitable defenses are expressly allowable under section 106, and
section 106 and section 107 utilize the same form of liability, "equitable defenses
should be available under Section 107 also."'47
The decisions in Mottolo and Conservation Chemical more closely comport
with the decision in Weinberger than do those in Part VI(A) because they take
into consideration the special characteristics of courts of equity," s which have
the power to consider the total fairness of the circumstances in reaching their
decisions. If a court involved in a CERCLA issue is indeed a court of equity,
then equitable defenses, such as the injunctions involved in Weinberger, should
be used to promote justice. 49 A court's equitable powers, including the ability
to recognize equitable defenses, are derived from its status and its function, and
not from the express provisions of a statute. 15 On the other hand, legal
defenses to statutory actions, such as CERCLA, must be derived from the
language of the statute. Construing section 107's express limitation of legal
defenses to proscribe equitable defenses as well misses the point of the courts'
equitable powers.
As stated in Part II, a court should determine which party can most equitably
pay for a non-fund-financed cleanup. The court violates its own duty as a court
of equity when it fails to consider the fairness between private parties. The strict
liability aspect of CERCLA is meant to hold a party liable for cleanup despite
its reasonable precautions. If a seller has compensated the purchaser by way of
a lower selling price, the court of equity should recognize that the seller's
responsibility has been completed.
145. Conservation Chemical, 619 F. Supp. at 204.
146. Id. at 205.
147. Id. at 204-05.
148. The Weinberger court emphasized that federal courts should resort to their special equitable
power of injunction only when there is a "threat of irreparable injury" and "inadequacy of legal
remedies." Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312. The court found the essence of equity jurisdiction to be "the
power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mold each decree to the necessities of the particular case.
Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it." Id. (quoting Hecht Co. v Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329
(1944)).
149. Upon deciding that equitable defenses were appropriate, the Monolo court first struck the
defendants' claim that the government was estopped from bringing a claim against them. The defendants
alleged that they only consented to allow the EPA to inspect their site when the EPA represented that
they would not seek response costs. The court denied this defense by showing that the EPA's authority
to respond to hazardous wastes was statutorily derived. The act, said the court, in order to be effective,
implicitly gives the EPA a right to inspect property. The court, for similar reasons, also struck the
defendants' defense based on the government's alleged waiver of its right to sue. United States v.
Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 627-28 (D.N.H. 1988).
150. See supra part III.
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VII
CONCLUSION
By interpreting CERCLA to proscribe equitable defenses, courts ignore the
dynamics of the transaction from which the present ownership of the commercial
property has derived. One of the underlying justifications for CERCLA's
statutory liability scheme is the desire to provide the government with a
mechanism to address the long unresolved problem of hazardous waste
contamination without unduly burdening taxpayers.51 CERCLA thus allows
the government to win cleanup cases as easily and as quickly as possible. The
liability scheme of retroactive, strict joint and several liability is a powerful tool
for monetary recovery, allowing for a quick turnaround of funds in order to keep
the resources available for investigation of the many other sites in need of
cleanup. The liability scheme, however, also allows private parties to apportion
the costs of the cleanup among themselves through an equitable action for
restitution; these actions do not require the involvement of government agencies
or the taxpayer.
The courts have not adequately distinguished between clean-up actions taken
by private parties and those taken by governmental agencies that utilize, at least
partially, Superfund. A private party cleanup has different policy considerations,
including the importance of incentives for private parties to remediate sites
without government intervention. Although such incentives are desirable, the
failure of courts also to recognize equitable defenses allows for the possibility of
double recoveries and windfalls to purchasers in the form of "risk insurance."
The rigid statutory liability structure of CERCLA is meant to ensure that
Superfund will be replenished, not to ensure that purchasers will have a legal
guarantee of the seller's liability so that they may ignore potential hazardous
waste problems when appraising a property. When the government is not
involved, thus removing the incentive to replenish Superfund, the role of the
court must be to determine who should pay for the cleanup.
151. See United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D.N.J. 1983) (stating that strict liability
is the best option for CERCLA because it imposes liability on parties who are responsible, and not on
the taxpayers, who would otherwise shoulder the burden of paying cleanup costs).
It may be argued that even when a causal agent pays for a cleanup, the taxpayers ultimately pay.
In many cases the corporate polluter simply will pass along the remediation costs, or a portion thereof,
to the consumer in the form of increased prices. Economically, the quantity of the responsible party's
product sold will be reduced in response to the price increase. One author suggests that the people who
will no longer be able to purchase the product due to the price increase will be those who have the least
resources to buy at that price, namely the poorer members of society. PETER S. WENZ, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL JusTIcE 1 (1988), citing Norman T. Faramelli, Ecological Responsibility and Economic Justice,
reprinted in WESTERN MAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 188 (Ian G. Barbour ed., 1973). The
argument is met by those who believe that this particular group of consumers-those who purchase the
polluter's product--should be the ultimate payors, because it was their consuming desires that created
the production motivation to begin with. If the market economy for this good is to reflect the full
information of costs accurately, those people at the margin who can no longer purchase the product due
to its higher price, now cannot do so because the new price now accurately reflects the true costs of the
product, not because the price has suddenly become greater. Prior to the learning of the true costs, the
consumer received a windfall by not paying for the complete social costs.
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In making this determination, courts must allocate costs among private
parties equitably. There are several approaches for a court's use of its equitable
powers in a private party CERCLA action. First, the court may ground its
authority in its inherent equitable nature as a court applying restitution, or, more
specifically, to the general equitable powers conferred upon it by Congress when
applying CERCLA. Second, the court may collapse the distinction between
section 107 and section 113 actions, and apply equitable principles, expressly
allowed by the latter section, when determining initial liability. Third, the court
may declare the seller liable at the liability stage, but deny any recovery to the
purchaser at the contribution stage. Alternatively, the parties may contractually
apportion CERCLA liability in the purchase agreement. The contractual devices
of indemnification and "hold harmless" clauses promote the use of disclosure and
investigation.
At present, all legal and economic incentives for disclosure and investigation
lie with the purchaser. The availability of the defense of caveat emptor in
private party CERCLA actions would create incentives for the seller to disclose
the condition and prior uses of the property. The seller would need to prove
fairness to the purchaser in order to invoke the powers of equity if he or she
were sued. Furthermore, knowledge that there could be no recourse against the
seller would strengthen existing incentives for the purchaser to investigate the
land thoroughly. The price attached to the land under this system would
effectively internalize the costs associated with hazardous waste cleanup.
The defense of caveat emptor thus makes CERCLA liability an ex ante,
rather than ex post, consideration in real property transactions. This allows the
parties to a transaction to have full information from the beginning about the
subject property. The hazardous waste contamination distortion would be
eliminated by bringing the true costs of the transaction to the bargaining table.
Those members of society who do not desire to buy property that carries the
added expense of a cleanup would utilize their resources more efficiently in other
markets. There would be fewer real property transactions, but the transactions
that occurred would reflect the true desires of the parties involved. This
approach promotes both fairness to the parties and economic efficiency.
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